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## ANNEX B: ORGANIZATIONS

### Overview

Strategic guidance and operational experience confirm that the nation requires expeditionary forces capable of sustained operations. As elusive and adaptive enemies seek refuge in remote and inaccessible areas, the norm will be short-notice operations, austere operational environments and incomplete information. Army forces will be required to fight on arrival throughout the battlespace and to dominate potential adversaries for the duration of a campaign. Campaigns are undertaken to bring about fundamental, favorable change in a crisis region and create enduring results. Many campaigns will likely entail lengthy periods of both major combat and stability operations. This requires the Army to sustain decisive operations for as long as necessary, adapting to changes as required. At the same time, we must reconcile expeditionary agility and responsiveness with staying power, durability and adaptability.

The Army's ability to successfully provide the joint force rapid expeditionary capabilities and to sustain land campaigns across the spectrum of conflict requires seamless active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) contributions. The AC will provide responsive, agile and expeditionary forces that respond within the first 30 days of an expeditionary operation. The RC, particularly the Army National Guard (ARNG), will provide the bulk of homeland defense support. Both AC and RC forces will provide depth through follow-on forces that provide the Joint Force commander campaign-quality capabilities necessary to conduct sustained and decisive land operations.

Fiscal Year 2006 (FY06) reflects the high-water mark of Army restructuring and conversion to create modular formations and obtain the correct mix of active and reserve force structure. Following FY06 efforts, the Army's operating force of FY07 will be comprised of approximately 75 percent of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), operational headquarters and Support Brigades. Key generating force organizations within the Army's institutional base will continue to evolve to support a brigade-centric Army operating under an Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process.

In FY06, the authorized ARNG end strength will hold constant at 350,000 and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) at 205,000. Under the Secretary of the Army's End Strength Plan, the AC will grow to 512,400 by the end of FY07. Within the AC, the operating force will grow from 315,000 to 355,000. The Army will shift personnel spaces into the operating force by reducing AC transient, trainee, hold-ee and student (TTHS) and generating force authorizations and gaining efficiencies from restationing activities, military-to-civilian conversions and business process adaptation. The Army Plan will ultimately reduce AC end strength to 482,400 by FY11. (Figure B-1).

### Strategic Planning, Modular Support Forces Analysis (MSFA) and Total Army Analysis (TAA)

The force-planning construct modeled in Total Army Analysis (TAA) remains focused on the 1-4-2-1 strategy of protect the homeland ("1"), deter forward in four critical regions ("4"), swiftly defeat adversaries in two near-simultaneous conflicts ("2"), while preserving for the President the option of decisively defeat-




Figure B-1. AC End Strength Plan

ing one of those adversaries (“1”). The Army shaped the conditions of their TAA process implementing a Modular Support Forces Analysis (MSFA) that yielded the Support Brigades required to sustain the brigade-centric Army. MSFA results informed the TAA process that in turn addressed the requirement to maintain sufficient force generation capability and the need for rotational forces to support small-scale contingency operations.

While maintaining the capabilities necessary to meet operational demands, TAA06-11 provided the basis for meeting the transformation objectives of modular conversion and the AC/RC force balance objectives. To meet these objectives, a temporary strength

increase of 30,000 within the AC is projected through the end of FY09. The mix of force structure allowance within both the ARNG and USAR will change as TTHS accounts are established in both components by the end of FY08.

To ensure timely force structure programming to meet operational demands and transformation objectives, TAA is undergoing a change in process and time line. During the fall of 2004, the Army conducted a “mini-TAA” to identify force structure needed to support the projected brigade-centric organizations. Beginning in January 2005, the Army initiated TAA08-13 to address all aspects of modular conversion, AC/RC balance, and rotational force requirements in preparation for the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 05) and the FY08-13 Plan. By adjusting to an annual force analysis cycle, TAA will ensure the proper mix of force capabilities to ensure maximum support to the Combatant Commanders. TAA 08-13 will culminate in February 2006 with the release of the Army Structure Message. Figure B-2 depicts the programmed FY06 Army Military Force Structure.




Figure B-2. AC and RC Force Structure in Fiscal Year 2006

## Army Transformation

Transformation of the Army occurs across the operating force (those units that deploy to conduct operations in support of Joint Force commander requirements) and the generating force (that portion of the Army that exists to carry out Title 10 functions required to provide relevant and ready land power capabilities to Joint Force commanders). The operating and generating force distinctions tend to blur in practice, but they provide useful constructs for capability development. Within the Army Campaign Plan, the Army differentiates transformation activities across the complementary groupings of organizations. Figure B-3 provides a construct for adaptation across the operating and generating forces.




Figure B-3. Near-term and Midterm Organizational Transformation

### Operating Force: AC/RC Rebalancing

The AC/RC rebalance initiative is an incremental process that has evolved over time to hasten the transformation of a post cold war Army into a force capable of efficiently and effectively addressing the warfighting requirements posed by a global war on terrorism. The total impact of this initiative is the adjustment of more than 100,000 spaces over program years 2004-2009.

The Army has addressed the AC/RC Rebalance initiative in three phases, which include:

1. **Phase 1** – Total Army Analysis 2004-2009, which constitutes the initial adjustment to

the force based on the realities of a post 9-11 security posture. Phase 1 affected approximately 25,000 of force structure across all three components with the principal goal of increasing the Army's capabilities in military police, military intelligence, Special Forces, chemical, civil affairs and psychological operations units. Much of this 25,000 of structure change is movement of capabilities from the RC the AC in order to address high-demand, low-density requirements. New space growth in the AC is offset by a corresponding reduction in TDA structure.

2. **Phase 2** – Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) guidance from the 9 July 2003 memorandum constituted the second phase of the rebalancing effort. This guidance directed the need to decrease the necessity for involuntary mobilization of the RC in the first 15 days of a rapid response operation. The Army rebalanced almost 10,000 of structure to reduce RC mobilization and eliminate demand for RC units in the initial phase of deployment.

3. **Phase 3** – The Chief of Staff, Army Focus Area Seven directive further expanded on rebalancing efforts. This phase adjusted approximately 91,000 structure in FY06-09 by eliminating the Authorized Level of Organization (ALO), the reduction of high-demand, low-density units in the AC, and establishment of TTHS accounts in the RC.

The following chart provides a summary of each of the three phases by fiscal year.

The AC/RC Rebalance Initiative is on track. The Army continues to review its force balance and make adjustments where necessary



Initiative		FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	Total
Phase 1	Restructure	3,706	10,801	4,355	1,163	2,607	1,542	24,799
Phase 2	RC Rotation	0	2,162	984	1,054	148	0	4,348
	SDTE	761	2,184	2,623	0	0	0	5,568
Phase 3	ALO & HD	0	1,696	3,346	60	1,026	0	6,128
	TTHS	0	9,400	45,743	15,547	12,710	0	83,400
	Unit Buys	0	0	0	632	349	0	981
Grand Total		4,467	26,243	57,051	18,456	16,840	1,542	125,224

in order to optimize the use of its available manpower and equitably distribute deployment burdens. The Army's structure balance is vetted through several processes to include TAA and ARFORGEN.

Many of the actions described above have been affected by the current operating tempo (OPTEMPO). For instance, units scheduled for inactivation as a result of planned Phase 3 actions in support of the establishment of TTHS like accounts in the RC have been delayed based on Combatant Commander requirements. Upon completion of scheduled deployments, units will complete their inactivation as scheduled.

The Force Structure Data Extract is shown in the chart below.

### Operating Force: Modular Forces

We are aggressively reshaping the force to become an Army of campaign quality with joint and expeditionary capabilities—transforming to win the war today while simultaneously positioning ourselves for future challenges. Army general-purpose forces are proving to be the primary military instrument to create favorable and enduring security conditions in crisis regions. However, strategic and operational requirements compel the Army to reconcile expeditionary agility

and responsiveness with staying power, durability and adaptability. Not only must the Army sustain decisive operations for as long as necessary to allow for political favorable resolution, Army forces must be ready to adapt to changes across the range of military operations and against learning and adaptive adversaries. To maximize force effectiveness, the Army is reorganizing to a modular, brigade-based force to achieve three primary goals:

- Increase the number of available BCTs to meet operational commitments while maintaining combat effectiveness that is equal or better than that of previous divisional BCTs.
- Create combat and support formations of common organizational designs that can be tailored to meet the varied demands of the Combatant Commanders—reducing joint planning and execution complexities.
- Redesign organizations to perform as integral parts of the Joint Force—making them more effective across the range of military operations and enhancing their ability to contribute to joint, interagency and multinational efforts.

Within its modular conversion strategy, the Army migrates capabilities that were previously found at higher echelons to the BCTs. Further supporting this effort, the Army is

Budget Data

Program*	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY05-09
Rebalance Forces	\$43.6	\$59.7	\$40.9	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$144.2
Address HD	\$28.1	\$4.1	\$4.1	\$0.8	\$0.0	\$37.1
Total	\$71.7	\$63.8	\$45.0	\$0.8	\$0.0	\$181.3

\*Based on Department of the Army PCP Submission to OSD for FY05-09

Force Structure Data Extract

Capability	FY04			FY11			Delta			
	AC	RC	Total	AC	RC	Total	AC	RC	Total	Change
Field Artillery	28,135	47,515	75,650	22,814	24,880	47,694	(5,321)	(22,635)	(27,956)	-37%
Air Defense	10,516	9,076	19,592	10,795	3,030	13,825	279	(6,046)	(5,767)	-29%
Engineer	17,359	61,515	78,874	21,794	46,728	68,522	4,435	(14,787)	(10,352)	-13%
Armor	24,669	28,836	53,505	19,419	12,905	32,324	(5,250)	(15,931)	(21,181)	-40%
Military Police	13,789	26,011	39,800	18,252	37,849	56,101	4,463	11,838	16,301	41%
Aviation	23,363	20,937	44,300	27,765	26,927	54,692	4,402	5,990	10,392	23%
Infantry	51,035	56,450	107,485	65,451	52,674	118,125	14,416	(3,776)	10,640	10%
Civil Affairs	351	5,784	6,135	692	6,248	6,940	341	464	805	13%
PSYOP	1,211	2,234	3,445	1,447	2,569	4,016	236	335	571	17%
Chemical	3,156	8,861	12,017	4,035	11,694	15,729	879	2,833	3,712	31%

converting most other operating force formations into modular, capabilities-based units with greater capacities for integration into tailorable and strategically responsive force capability packages. Modular operational headquarters will provide robust command and control and will be better able to serve as joint headquarters. Modular Support Brigades and combat support (CS)/combat service support (CSS) units with reduced logistics footprints, enhanced battlespace awareness, and improved sense-and-respond logistics

capabilities will improve joint force responsiveness, versatility and sustainability.

This modular conversion effort is the greatest restructuring of Army forces since World War II, and it affects nearly every organization in our inventory. Most combat formations and headquarters will be complete by 2008; theater Army headquarters will be completed by 2009, and Support Brigades will be completed by 2011 (Figure B-4).

	AC	ARNG	USAR		AC	ARNG	USAR
<b>Force Application</b>				<b>Protection</b>			
Brigade Combat Team (BCT) Total	42 *	28 *		Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) (CSB(ME))	3	14 *	2
Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT)	18	6		Engineer Brigade (EN)	4	8 *	4
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT)	6	1		Military Police Brigade and Criminal Investigation Detachments (MP/CID)	4	2	
Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT)	17	21		Interment/Resettlement Brigade (I/R)		1	3
Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR)	1			Air Defense Brigade	4	2	
Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFG(A))	5	2		Chemical Brigade (NBC)	1 ***	1	1
Civil Affairs Brigades (CA)	1		8	Criminal Investigation Detachment (CID)	2		
Psychological Operations Groups (PSYOP)	1		2	National Missile Defense Brigade (NMD)		1	
Ranger Regiment	1						
Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) Total	11	7		<b>Focused Logistics</b>			
CAB (Heavy)	6	2		Sustainment Brigade (SUST)	13	9	8
CAB (Medium)	4			Ordnance Group (Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD))	2	1	
CAB (Light)	1			Quartermaster Group (Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL))	1		3
CAB (Air Expeditionary)		5		Regional Support Groups		17	25
Theater Aviation Brigade	1	5	1	Medical Support Command	4		10
Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR)	1						
Fires Brigade	6 *	7 *		<b>Battlespace Awareness</b>			
Information Operations Group	—	TBD	—	Intelligence Brigade (MI)	8	1	
				Electronic Warfare Group (EW)	2		
				Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BFSB)	3	2	
<b>Command and Control</b>				<b>Miscellaneous</b> ****			
Army Service Component Commands	9 **			Financial Management Center (FMC)	2		5
Corps	3			Space Brigade	1		
Division	10	8					
Signal Brigade	7	2	1				

\* Structure decisions still in progress as of 25 FEB 06.

\*\*\* Does not include Homeland Defense capabilities

\*\* 5 Theater Army Headquarters

\*\*\*\* Training units and other Soldier support functions to be captured in Army Campaign Plan

3 Functional ASCCs

1 Non-modular Army Headquarters (EUSA)

Figure B-4. Army Force Structure Baseline

Though quickly implemented in response to the global war on terrorism, these organizational changes are a well-measured response. Organization designs are consistent with concepts and methods of operation articulated within the Army's Future Force Capstone Concept, but these designs are tempered by the technological capabilities that are reasonably available within the near term. Standardized and enhanced battle command capabilities that improve joint interdependency and situational awareness enable this change. Networked battle command, improved intelligence, and robust target acquisition systems enable our Soldiers to fight for and maintain information superiority with faster speeds of command, enhanced self-synchronization between units and dramatically improved combat effectiveness.

**Maneuver Brigades.** The decisive effort of Army transformation is the creation of modular, combined arms maneuver BCTs. As part of this transformation, the Army migrates capabilities that were previously found at divisions and corps to the brigade—the building block of combat forces in the future force. Each type of brigade will be of standard configuration and organization. Further, these brigades will gain improved force packaging, sustainability, battle command and situational awareness while retaining the same lethality as the larger, task-organized BCTs. These units will serve as the foundation for a land force that is balanced and postured for rapid deployment and sustained operations worldwide.

The three BCT designs are the Heavy (HBCT), Infantry (IBCT) and Stryker (SBCT). These BCTs are similar in overall configuration. The main difference is that the SBCT has three maneuver battalions instead of two as in the HBCT and IBCT. The HBCT has two combined arms battalions, an armed

reconnaissance squadron, a fires battalion, a support battalion and a brigade special troops battalion. The IBCT has two infantry battalions, a reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron, a fires battalion, a support battalion and a brigade special troops battalion. The SBCT has three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition RSTA squadron, a fires battalion, engineer, signal, MI and anti-armor companies.

- The brigade special troops battalion provides the command posts, liaisons, military intelligence and signal support for the HBCT and IBCT. The IBCT also has an engineer company.
- The armed reconnaissance squadron (HBCT) and RSTA squadrons (IBCT and SBCT) conduct reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition for the BCT.
- Maneuver battalions. The combined arms battalions in the HBCT consist of two infantry, two armor and one engineer companies. The infantry battalions in the IBCT consist of three infantry and one weapons companies. The infantry battalions in the SBCT have three infantry companies.
- The fires battalion consists of two artillery batteries in the HBCT and IBCT. The SBCT has three artillery batteries. All have target acquisition and counter-mortar radar systems.
- The support battalion provides additional transportation, distribution and maintenance functions that cannot be covered by the forward support companies. It also directly supports the brigade special troops battalion.

As a hedge against future uncertainty, the Army is retaining the armored cavalry regiment configuration. In major combat






Figure B-5. Brigade Combat Teams

operations, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) should accurately see, understand and shape the enemy force before committing brigades to fight battles and engagements. Technical sensors cannot provide accurate information about enemy forces in complex environments to meet the JFLCC commander's critical information requirements. The armored cavalry regiment (ACR) has unique capabilities to effectively and efficiently meet these operational-level requirements for reconnaissance, security, offensive and defensive operations.

**Operational Headquarters.** In 2003, the Army articulated a plan to replace the existing structure of divisions, corps and echelons above corps with only two command echelons. Operational experience and analysis led us to reevaluate this plan and retain the corps as a 3-star level operational headquarters. Though the Army is retaining this

echelon, it has significantly increased the capabilities of these headquarters and units to improve strategic flexibility and support to the Joint Force commander. Each theater Army will have the capability to be both Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and JFLCC to support geographic Combatant Commanders. This was not the case before modular conversions. The corps and division have the Army structure and manning necessary to serve as a joint task force (JTF) or JFLCC. This change to their organization reduces the risk of last minute assignment of staff personnel necessary for augmentation, preserving readiness across the force and enabling the Army to sustain command and control through periods of continuous operations. As a result of these increased capabilities, the Army can designate either a corps or a division headquarters to serve as a JTF or JFLCC based on the nature of the mission. Any BCT or Support Brigade may be assigned

to any corps or division without extensive task organization or augmentation. This improves the strategic flexibility to provide exactly the right capabilities to support the Joint Force commander. Each type of headquarters will employ separable, deployable command posts for rapid response and entry, and these headquarters will be designed for network-enabled operation.

**Corps and Divisions.** The corps and divisions will be reorganized into headquarters with deployable command posts. The division will remain the Army's primary operational-level headquarters, and the corps will generally be assigned against intermediate headquarters, JTF or JFLCC responsibilities. However, divisions and corps will both be capable of functioning as a JTF and as a JFLCC with augmentation. Both organizations are designed to command and control a tailored mix of BCTs and Support Brigades.

**Armies.** Army or theater Army headquarters will serve as the Army component of a geographic combatant command. The theater Army will focus on the Army's component responsibilities for the entire theater's joint, interagency and multinational operational land forces. During major combat operations, where the geographic Combatant Commander is the Joint Force commander, the theater Army can become the JFLCC and exercise operational control over tactical land forces. Theater armies also command and control theater-level subordinate headquarters tailored to the requirements of the Joint Force commander and conditions in the theater.

**Theater Subordinate Commands.** At the theater level, theater Army headquarters may exercise command and control for up to seven different types of modular theater-level subordinate commands. These organizations fulfill unique command and control requirements

over Support Brigades and area functions. The theater-level subordinate commands include:

- **Signal.** Theater-level command, control, communications, computers, communication, and information management is executed by a Signal Command (Theater) or a Tactical Theater Signal Brigade. These organizations execute network operations within the Army's portion of the Global Information Grid.
- **Intelligence.** Theater-level intelligence is executed by Theater Intelligence Brigades or Theater Intelligence Groups. These organizations coordinate and leverage joint and national intelligence capabilities in support of the Army or Joint Force commander.
- **Sustainment.** Theater-level sustainment and intra-theater logistics command and control (C2) is executed by the Theater Sustainment Command. This command also coordinates inter-theater logistics. The Theater Sustainment Command integrates Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Special Operations Forces, Army Materiel Command (AMC), contractor and other agencies in sustainment operations. Theater Sustainment Command retains deployable command posts for distributed or early entry operations.
- **Civil Affairs.** Theater-level civil affairs planning, coordination, and synchronization and civil-military operations support is executed by the Civil Affairs Command. Additionally, this command provides staff augmentation, functional specialty teams, a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)



and a Civil Information Management (CIM) cell.

- **Medical.** Theater-level medical C2 and administration is executed by the Medical Deployment Support Command. This command also retains an operational command post for distributed or early entry operations.
- **Aviation.** Two CONUS-based Theater Aviation Commands will establish a pool of theater-level aviation to support missions requiring reinforcement of Combat Aviation Brigades. Each command retains a Support Brigade, an assault brigade and a Theater Aviation Operations Command (TAOC).
- **Air and Missile Defense.** Some theaters will receive Area Air and Missile Defense Commands (AAMDC) to provide critical theater air defense and missile defense against hostile aircraft, ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.

**Support Brigades.** The Army retains a wide array of functional Support Brigades that will be discussed later in this annex. In addition to improving the capabilities within these functional Support Brigades, the Army is also developing multifunctional Support Brigades to increase its capabilities for full-spectrum operations. Support Brigades are self-contained organizations that are capable of deploying and operating independently. They will be tailorable based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time, troops available and civilian (METT-TC). The five multifunctional Support Brigade types are:

- Fires Brigade (Fires)

- Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BfSB)
- Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement) (CSB(ME))
- Sustainment Brigade (SUST BDE)
- Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB)

Each Support Brigade shares a set of common characteristics. The brigades will be modular so that they can plug in to or out of any headquarters easily and effectively. Each will have the network connectivity and a liaison officer to work not only for higher operational headquarters, but also for another service, another functional headquarters or a multinational headquarters. These units will be inherently joint in that they will be able to access and use appropriate joint enablers to accomplish their functions, and they will be able to, in turn, contribute to the joint capability. Finally, the Support Brigades will have capabilities that can be used by the operational commander to task organize other elements assigned to the force package or task force.

**Fires Brigade.** The fires brigade will provide the land force commander with precision strike capabilities that can control both Army and joint fires throughout the depth of the area of operations. It has organic target acquisition capabilities and will be tied




Figure B-6. Fires Brigade

closely to reconnaissance and surveillance assets. It is capable of executing both lethal and nonlethal effects for the commander and will be able to direct armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

**Battlefield Surveillance Brigade.** As its primary mission, the BfSB will synchronize all of the dedicated collection assets available to the operational commander. It will link to joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. This brigade will complement the situational awareness developed by the maneuver brigades and lead the fight for information within its area of operation.

**Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement).** The CSB(ME) brigade will synchronize protection, mobility and unique effects capabilities across the entire area of operations. It can serve as the joint rear co-




Figure B-8. Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement)




Figure B-7. Battlefield Surveillance Brigade




Figure B-9. Sustainment Brigade

ordinator when the Joint Force commander designates the Army to carry out this function. It will have a staff capable of planning air defense, nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defense, military police actions and construction engineer tasks.

**Sustainment Brigade.** The sustainment brigade will provide logistics support for all echelons within the area of operations. The sustainment brigade will link theater-level supply and service activities with the maneuver brigades' organic sustainment organizations. Over the near term, the Army is developing a comprehensive sustainment concept for the new force design.

**Combat Aviation Brigade.** The CAB will be fully capable of planning, preparing for, executing and assessing mobile strike operations and deep attacks using attack helicopters. It will retain a fully capable fire support element that possesses suppression of enemy air defense, maintains the intelligence links to track targets, and includes the Army aviation battle command element to coordinate airspace control measures as necessary—all linked to the appropriate joint systems. CABs come in four variants: Heavy, medium, light and ARNG aviation expeditionary brigades. In addition to the four CAB variants, the Army is also converting the aviation squadrons associated with the armored cavalry regiments to air cavalry squadrons. Air cavalry squadrons will continue to support ACR or SBCT operations as required.

When completed, Army modular organizations will be menu items—brigade-sized formations that accomplish the major functions required for the full range of military operations from which the Joint Force com-

mander may choose to meet his needs. The mission requirements determine the mix of forces without the constraints of fixed, large, standing organizations such as divisions or corps.

**Posture of Army Modular Formations.** The Army is adjusting its global force posture to meet the needs of Combatant Commanders. We are taking steps to accelerate our strategic responsiveness while simultaneously reducing our overseas footprint and exposure:

- Establishing a comprehensive Army Force Generation process to provide Combatant Commanders and civil authorities with rapidly deployable and employable Army forces
- Resetting Army prepositioned equipment sets into modular configurations
- Building modular capabilities that improve theater force reception and deployed logistics






Figure B-10. Combat Aviation Brigade Variants





### Figure B-11. AC Operational Headquarters and BCT Stationing in 2013






Figure B-13. ARNG Operational Headquarters and BCT Stationing in 2013



### ARNG Support Brigade and SOF Stationing in 2013 \*

\* As of 15 FEB 06

Does not include theater command or logistics headquarters

As of printing, ARNG had not decided which Air Expeditionary Brigade (AEB) to inactivate.

As of printing, ARNG had not identified several engineer, fires, air defense, sustainment, CSB(ME), and BFSB to activate.

## Annex B Organizations




Figure B-15. USAR Support Brigade and ARSOF Stationing in 2013

- Identifying and improving infrastructure at critical power projection installations to increase to support mobilization, demobilization and rapid deployment. Updating institutional processes to prepare forces for rapid deployments and to support forces in sustained expeditionary operations. Parallel with Army efforts to improve responsiveness, the Army is repositioning its ground forces to meet a unit rotation model that is synchronized to Army force generation processes. These efforts include Army support of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) efforts.

### Operating Force: Functional Capabilities

Though modular Army formations are well-equipped to operate across the full range of military operations, the Army is examining specific functional capabilities that it provides to the Combatant Commanders.

**Modular Sustainment.** As the Army modularly converts to improve its full-spectrum capabilities, its logistics capability will similarly transform. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), AMC and units in the field are exploring concepts for modularly converting Army tactical and operational-level sustainment units to provide the best possible support to Army units operating as part of a joint force. The effect of modularity on logistics will be characterized by more modular and capable sustainment organizations and reduced echelons that allow for increased throughput directly to forward locations. At the core of this shift is the development of a combat force with increased self-sustainment capabilities that can conduct sustainment operations internally while relying on the distribution system to enable logistics reach.

**Logistics command and control (C2)** will be capable of deploying small elements immediately and expanding as the theater develops. This guarantees a single logistics C2 within the theater from the beginning of any operation. The C2 structure will be joint-capable and interdependent. The modular Army will be expeditionary and its logistics capability will enable the rapid employment of these forces. A theater opening capability will meet this need. This organization will be specifically designed, equipped and trained to quickly receive forces and prepare them for onward movement and employment. No longer will maneuver units be expected to devote their organic assets to receive themselves in an area of responsibility (AOR).

The Army is committed to an enterprise solution for integrated logistics processes, the ability to support collaborative planning and forecasting, and an overarching architecture integrated within the joint business enterprise. Using commercial off-the-shelf technology, Army logistics is integrating its strategic business processes with its tactical logistics systems, including development of a single data repository for seamless linkage from the national to the tactical level.

At all levels, Army logistics is prepared to contribute to and employ joint solutions for the Joint Force commander. The Army will provide combatant and expeditionary capabilities that support the full range of military operations at all levels. This includes a responsive logistics infrastructure with simultaneous deployment, employment and sustainment capabilities at the strategic and operational levels, complemented by a single, integrated and responsive end-to-end distribution system. These capabilities will integrate interagency and multinational resources and move to a single joint logistics command and



control capability for joint force and regional Combatant Commanders.

**Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF).**

Army Special Operations Forces provide the joint force with niche capabilities in shaping the security environment by dissuading and deterring potential adversaries, creating indigenous capabilities that strengthen resistance against potential adversaries, and executing prompt, responsive, and decisive operations to achieve military and national objectives. ARSOF transformation and growth is critical to sustain the current and projected OP-TEMPO requirements of the global war on terrorism and other future operations. Army Special Operations Forces have over 6,400 Soldiers actively engaged in 74 countries on 119 missions. This OPTEMPO has required nearly total commitment of all AC and RC ARSOF forces for either current or projected operations.

ARSOF, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Aviation, Rangers and combat service support (CSS) restructuring is essential to a long-term rotational expeditionary capability that supports the Army transformation strategy.

- **Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFG (A)).** Band I redesign increases combat power by providing augmentation in battle staff support to Special Forces Operations Base (SFOB)(group) and Forward Operating Base (FOB)(battalion) that raise their self-sufficiency and sustainment capabilities and release an additional 12 Operational Detachment Alphas (ODA)(detachment) for tactical employment. SFG (A) Band II redesign further amplifies the battle staff, resulting in still greater self-sufficiency and sustainment capabilities. It maximizes the SFG (A) ability to train, plan, conduct and sustain

full-spectrum unconventional warfare operations and theater crisis response missions. It integrates situational awareness technology and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to the SF Advanced Operations Base (AOB)(company) level. SFG (A) Band III redesign adds an additional Special Forces battalion, a fire support element within the group headquarters to each of the five AC Special Forces Group (Airborne). SFG (A) Band I-III will transform the Special Forces Group (Airborne) into an organization of significantly greater depth, capability, and self sufficiency that is more capable of prosecuting ARSOF missions in support of the global war on terrorism.

- **Civil Affairs (CA).** Civil Affairs redesign provides a more robust force structure in support of ARSOF requirements by creating an AC CA brigade with four regionally oriented AC CA battalions and adding a fourth RC CA company to each USAR CA battalion. Common to AC and RC redesigns are new capabilities such as enhanced Civil Affairs Teams (CAT), an organic and deployable CMOC, organic Civil Affairs Planning Teams (CAPT), and an organic Civil Information Management (CIM) cell capable of integrating and fusing the Civil Common Operating Picture (COP) into the Joint Force commander's COP.
- **Psychological Operations (PSYOP).** PSYOP redesign creates additional AC and RC Tactical PSYOP Companies and two additional RC Tactical Battalions. Common between AC and RC redesigns are new capabilities such as enhanced tactical PSYOP companies equipped with organic print capability, enhanced Regional PSYOP battalions in the AC only that are capable of forming the core of Psychological Operations Task Forces

(POTF). AC and RC dissemination forces have been rebalanced, with improved reachback technologies that ensure the rapid development and production of PSYOP products, and fielding of the latest product dissemination technology (radio, TV, print) for advanced distribution capabilities.

- **Ranger Regiment.** Ranger XXI force structure redesign will afford the 75th Ranger Regiment the requisite command, control, reconnaissance, intelligence, strike and support personnel, equipment, and training to conduct sustained combat operations in support of the global war on terrorism, conduct combat operations in support of Combatant Commanders across the full spectrum of conflict, and train to the Ranger standard, all while maintaining systems at home station.
- **Army Special Operations Aviation (ARSOA).** ARSOA redesign creates a robust force structure for the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) capable of providing sustained special operations rotary-wing aviation support (high-demand/low-density asset) to both Army and other joint SOF elements. The Forward Expeditionary force structure is conceptually modular; aviation expeditionary forces are more flexible, sustainable and mission tailored. Once resourced, all ARSOA battalions will field like-model aircraft (MH-47G, MH-60M and A/MH-6M) and be able to deploy modular Special Operations Aviation Expeditionary Detachments (SOAED) with enhanced command, control and sustainment capabilities.
- **ARSOF Sustainment.** The USASOC will restructure ARSOF operational level logistical concept by creating the Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations)(Airborne)

that will plan, integrate and assess Army common and SOF peculiar logistics to sustain SOF employment. The USASOC will activate five group support battalions organic to each of the AC Special Forces Group, a support operations detachment for the Ranger special troop battalion (RSTB), 75th Ranger Regiment and three Ranger battalion support companies to each Ranger battalion.

**Air and Missile Defense (AMD).** The Army will no longer provide an organic Air Defense Artillery (ADA) battalion to its divisions. Six of the ten AC divisional ADA battalions and four of the eight ARNG divisional ADA battalions will inactivate. The remaining four AC divisional ADA battalions, along with four ARNG divisional ADA battalions, will be pooled at the theater-level to provide air and missile defense protection based on METT-TC. The pool of Army AMD resources will address operational requirements in a tailorable and timely manner without stripping assigned AMD capability from other missions. This pooling concept supports the Army's effort to move to modular designs that allow force tailoring of units better sized to meet Combatant Commanders needs and homeland security/defense requirements.

The AMD transition plan converts the AMD force to modular designs with the capability to meet the emerging threat of tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.

**Future Engineer Force.** Engineer transformation is an essential part of achieving the capabilities required for joint and Army future force success. The primary function of the Army engineer is to provide assured mobility—the processes, actions, and enabling capabilities intended to guarantee the maneuver force commander the ability to maneuver

when and where he desires, without interruption or delay, to achieve his intent. The future engineer force provides this assurance through modular organizations that are adaptable and capable of augmenting maneuver BCTs, Support Brigades, divisions and corps. There are two categories of future engineer force organizations: Embedded Engineer Force and Engineer Force Pool.

The Embedded Engineer Force is organic to the maneuver BCTs. The Engineer Force Pool includes all engineer units not organic to BCTs or embedded in a BCT, division or corps staff. The Engineer Force Pool consists of baseline forces, mission unit forces and Engineer battle command. The baseline engineer force contains modular engineer capabilities and scalable command and control plugs frequently required by both maneuver BCTs and Support Brigades supporting division and corps. Baseline forces serve as the primary building blocks for providing tactical and operational engineer capabilities. The mission unit force is comprised of highly specialized engineer capabilities required by baseline forces to execute some missions in support of maneuver BCTs, Support Brigades, operational headquarters and virtually most of the engineer missions at theater level.

**Medical Modernization.** The Army continues to work toward completion of the Medical Reengineering Initiative (MRI) as resources become available. MRI reorganizes deployable medical forces at the theater level and provides the transitional pathway to the future force. To permit rapid integration to joint expeditionary applications, the Army Medical Department has introduced a new concept known as Adaptive Medical Increments (AMI). AMI restructures existing medical forces into a selection of prepackaged, cellular subcomponents that can be chosen as menu items.

As a component of Army-wide restructuring, our RC is divesting itself of specific laboratory specialties that historically are difficult to recruit and maintain. At the same time, the RC is increasing its medical logistics support capabilities. This shift of technical specialties to the AC will improve the Army's ability to respond quickly to the growing number of contingencies across the globe.

**Chemical Corps Redesign.** The U.S. Army Chemical Corps is undertaking a dramatic change of its force structure to create modular and flexible organizations to better support both warfighters and domestic response requirements. The redesign of the Chemical Corps simplifies its overall force structure. The CS companies, corps and heavy divisional chemical companies will all be multifunctional companies. The CS Company will have platoons capable of conducting NBC reconnaissance and decontamination missions. Additionally, these companies will have platoons structured to perform biological detection. All of these companies will possess the skills and training necessary to support forces in combat as well as to provide support to DOD or civilian authorities in response to domestic chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents. Challenges are anticipated in ensuring these units are equipped with the reconnaissance platforms, decontamination systems and biological detection equipment necessary to perform their critical missions.

Baseline biological detection and large area smoke generation will continue to be provided by specialized units, and Chemical Corps personnel will continue to man critical staff positions throughout the Army to advise and train personnel in NBC defense.

**Military Police.** Military Police Corps changes are a combination of organiza-



tional designs, increases in force structure to better accommodate requirements and better balance of the AC/RC force mix. The primary design change is restructure of the internment/resettlement (I/R) battalions to provide the Soldier/unit skill set required to better meet current and emerging worldwide detainee operations, while still being able to conduct traditional enemy prisoners of war (EPW) and U.S. military confinement missions. The new I/R battalion design retains existing modular and scalable characteristics, and can be sourced with AC and RC units. As part of the modular BCT designs, a robust MP platoon is now organic to the HBCTs and IBCTs. Additionally, the Military Police Corps is standardizing many of its companies. This effort decreases the number of specialized limited purpose organizations and increases the number of multifunctional MP CS companies. These multi-functional companies will be optimized to support other modular units.

Demand for law enforcement, criminal investigations, detention operations and combat operations will remain high during this period of sustained operations. The MP Corps in particular will experience very high operational tempo compared to the rest of the force, and the Army estimates that this demand will remain high. In response, the Army is increasing the number of AC MP organizations to better meet requirements to reduce stress on MP units. Military police will be better organized to meet sustained rotational demands for operations such as guarding detainees, contributing to peacekeeping missions, investigating terrorist and criminal operations, and supporting reestablishment of law and order, conducting stability, and countering insurgency operations following major combat operations.

**Army Signal.** Army Signal force structure is in the process of reorganization through

multiple force design updates: Integrated Theater Signal Battalion (ITSB), Tactical Installation and Networking (TIN) Company, JTF/JFLCC) command, control, communications, and computers (C4) packages, and network operations (NETOPS) updates. These changes create a deployable, scalable, modular structure with standardized capability, equipment and training Army wide. The ITSB provides a multifunctional structure that significantly streamlines theater signal structure; reduces the requirement to task organize (“train-as-we-fight” dictum), and bridges the gap between the current and future signal architecture. The TIN company design adds/enhances network installation capabilities to the Army’s cable and wire companies. The new design is flexible enough to resource the range of military operations from major combat operations to small small-scale contingencies to homeland defense operations. The NETOPS force structure update implements the three tenets of NETOPS (network management, information assurance, and information dissemination management) in a tiered Signal command structure providing real time collaborative, integrated, and seamless end-to-end management and defense of theater level strategic and tactical networks for all Army global applications and information services. This is only the beginning of reshaping Army Signal force structure. Ongoing developments in signal structure below the corps level are still being refined. The Army is leveraging technological developments in order to consolidate networks into fully integrated enterprise architectures for all Army forces.

**Multi-Component Units.** A Multi-Component Unit (MCU) combines personnel and/or equipment from more than one component on a single authorization document. The intent is to maximize integration of AC and RC resources in an austere environment. MCUs

have unity of command and control similar to that of single component units. MCU brigade and division headquarters (such as those in the Division XXI) were reorganized to component pure. However, CS and CSS units of echelons above the brigade continue to provide support optimizing AC and RC resources. MCU status does not change a unit's doctrinal requirement for personnel and equipment, force packaging, or tiered resourcing. MCU selection is based on mission requirements, unique component capabilities and limitations, readiness implications, efficiencies to be gained, and the ability and willingness of each component to contribute the necessary resources. The Army continues to refine the mix of AC and RC in these units to enable them to more effectively support mission requirements.

**Posture of Army Functional Organizations.** Army functional organizations and their stationing are still undergoing significant review and will be captured in the Army Campaign Plan, Change 3, to be published in mid-2006.

### **Operating and Generating Forces: Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)**

The new strategic context of continuous operations renders obsolete the old Army readiness paradigm of "all ready, all the time." Continuous, full-spectrum expeditionary operations are the new reality. To meet this new strategic context, the Army is developing a process of force generation to provide Combatant Commanders and civil authorities with rapidly deployable, employable, and sustainable force capabilities packages tailored to specific mission requirements. Implementation of ARFORGEN cuts across the entire Army. While having a profound effect on operating forces, ARFORGEN processes also shape the ways the institutional

base executes Service Title 10 and executive agent functions.

Army Force Generation leverages modular unit designs and operational cycles to provide a sustained deployment posture of operationally ready units in predictable patterns. The process retains the capability to surge combat power for major combat operations. The ARFORGEN process assists commanders to identify predictable deployment windows and manage readiness and training of forces accordingly. These windows are based on the objective cyclic rotation rates of active and RC forces defined in 9 July 2003 SECDEF memorandum goals: One deployment in three years for the AC and one deployment in six years for the RC.

The ARFORGEN process creates operational readiness cycles where individual units increase their readiness over time, culminating in full mission readiness and availability to deploy. Manning, equipping, resourcing and training processes are synchronized to the ARFORGEN process. To achieve the readiness progression required by operational readiness cycles, units transition through three ARFORGEN-defined readiness pools:

- **Reset/Train.** Units recover from previous deployments, reconstitute, reset equipment, receive new equipment, assign new personnel and train to achieve the required unit capability level necessary to enter the READY force pool.
- **Ready.** Units are assessed as ready to conduct mission preparation and higher-level collective training with other operational headquarters for upcoming missions. These units are also eligible to fill operational surge requirements, if necessary.




Figure B-16. ARFORGEN

UNITS	FY10 Force Mix	RESET / TRAIN FORCE POOL	READY FORCE POOL	AVAILABLE FORCE POOL
Operational HQs	19			
AC BCTs	HVY 19 SBCT 6 INF 17 <b>42</b>	HVY 5 SBCT 2 INF 4 11	HVY 8 SBCT 2 INF 7 17	HVY 6 SBCT 2 INF 6 <b>14</b> ← 31 deployable →
RC BCTs	HVY 6 SBCT 1 INF 21 <b>28</b>	HVY 3 SBCT 1 INF 10 14	HVY 2 SBCT 0 INF 7 9	HVY 1 SBCT 0 INF 4 <b>5</b> ← 14 deployable →
AC Support Brigades	CAB 11 SUSTAIN 13 FIRES 5 BFSB 3 CSB(ME) 3	CAB 3 SUSTAIN 3 FIRES 1 BFSB 1 CSB(ME) 1	CAB 4 SUSTAIN 6 FIRES 2 BFSB 1 CSB(ME) 1	CAB 4 SUSTAIN 4 FIRES 2 BFSB 1 CSB(ME) 1
RC Support Brigades	CAB 7 SUSTAIN 17 FIRES 7 CSB(ME) 14	CAB 4 SUSTAIN 9 FIRES 4 CSB(ME) 7	CAB 2 SUSTAIN 5 FIRES 2 CSB(ME) 6	CAB 1 SUSTAIN 3 FIRES 1 CSB(ME) 2
<b>Increasing Unit Readiness</b>		Not Ready or Available for MCO ≈ 17% - 25% of AC ≈ 50% of RC	Surge Capability ≈ 42% - 50% of AC ≈ 33% of RC	Available or Deployed ≈ 33% of AC ≈ 17% of RC
* Force Pool Distribution Rules:		AC: 1/4 RC: 1/2	AC: 5/12 RC: 1/3	AC: 1/3 RC: 1/6

Figure B-17. ARFORGEN



- **Available.** Units that are within their assigned window for potential deployment. Units will be sourced against operational or contingency requirements.

## Generating Force: Institutional Adaptation

Under U.S. Code Title 10, the Army's generating forces provide management, development, readiness, deployment and sustainment of Army operating forces. The Army's generating force consists of approximately 2,400 units and consists of approximately 25 percent of total Army authorized end strength across the AC and RC.

Despite alleviating stress through the temporary 30,000 Soldier increase in our operating strength, the Army will remain stressed to meet anticipated requirements. In September 2005, the Army revised downward the

period of time that it estimated it could afford to maintain a 512,400 force. To further grow the operational forces within the Army during a period of declining budgets and manpower authorizations, we are conducting a Total Army Analysis process to design a 482,400 AC and 555,000 RC force that appropriately balances force management risks.

This updated TAA and its aggressive restructuring effort will attempt to shift 40,000 Soldiers from the generating force into operating forces over the next six years. The Army intends to implement personnel policies that gain efficiencies in the Army's institutional base and generating forces while accepting greater risk within our combat support and combat service support formations. Combined, these initiatives should allow the Army to retain the gains made in combat formations and operational headquarters while the additional personnel authorizations are still afford-




Figure B-18. Army Generating Forces

able. Force management risk is high within this area, and we must preserve the viability of support and generating force functions while we attempt to increase combat power at a 482,400 end strength.

The generating force is particularly vulnerable to increasing operational commitments and fiscal pressures. It is unlikely that resources for sustaining a protracted conflict and preparing ourselves for the next one will increase significantly. The Army must be prepared for a reduction in funding, with a concurrent deterioration in the Army's equipment, industrial base and infrastructure. Coinciding with aforementioned projected cuts within the generating force starting in FY08, increasing operational demands for generating force capabilities emphasizes the gravity of the decisions the Army must make to balance operating and generating force capabilities.

This design of the generating force is a critical component of the overall Army transformation strategy and is captured under the campaign objective of "Adapt the Institutional Army" within the Army Campaign Plan. Institutional adaptation began implementation in late 2005 with a series of decisions to achieve the following goals:

- Transform the institutional base to more efficiently perform Service Title 10 and executive agent functions that support implementation of Army Force Generation.
- Divest nonessential functions, remove unnecessary layering and duplication, consolidate functions, resource in the most cost-effective manner, and privatize or outsource functions where applicable.
- Develop a joint interdependent, end-to-end logistics structure that integrates a responsive civil-military sustaining base

to better meet Army operational requirements.

- Foster a culture of innovation to significantly increase institutional agility.
- Convert military positions to civilian positions, where appropriate, to improve availability of Soldiers for deploying units.

### **Generating Force: Business Transformation**

The Army is aggressively seeking ways to prioritize our limited resources to meet our most strategically significant requirements while increasing our individual and organizational productivity. To accomplish this, the Army is transforming the way we do business. The Army is adapting many components of existing processes, to include:

- Adapting the institutional base of the Army in terms of roles and resources to gain efficiencies. Simultaneously, the Army can apply personnel savings from this restructuring to increase capabilities in the operating force.
- Increasing the productivity of business processes to minimize the impact of fiscal pressures and emerging requirements. Enhanced productivity results from reforming value chains while simultaneously divesting non-core functions.
- Improving the level of proficiency of our organizational leaders to implement disciplined and measurable approaches to reduce waste and streamline organizations—following Lean Six Sigma and other best practices.

Business transformation will follow an aggressive schedule—with Lean Six Sigma implementation across the Army starting in FY06. By applying these techniques, the Army will

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develop a competitive advantage required by our operational environment. In short, we can eliminate waste and focus on providing trained, equipped, educated, experienced and manned forces to the Combatant Commanders.

## Conclusion

The Army's efforts to reshape its organization are comprehensive and lay at the heart of its transformation efforts. Like pieces of a puzzle, Army force generation processes are necessary complements to ensure that modular conversion, restructuring and restoration initiatives achieve the Army's objective to be a campaign-quality, joint and expedi-

tionary force. Army formations stationed at power projection installations are pooled into force packages under ARFORGEN to make expeditionary operations easier to plan and execute. Restructuring across the AC and RC optimizes Army operating forces to the right capabilities packages for sustained operations. Generating force and business transformation efforts will simultaneously improve the Army's ability to man, train and equip Army operating forces during a period of dwindling resources and heavy operational demand. Implementing these interlocking concepts will relieve stress on the force, provide time to train, create more predictable deployment schedules, and enable the Army to maintain a continuous supply of ready land power to Combatant Commanders and civil authorities.